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OBJECTS IN MANIFOLD TIMES: DELEUZE AND 
THE SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY OF OBJECTS 
AS PROCESSES
James Williams
The University of  Dundee
AbstrAct: This essay shows how real objects must be processes for Gilles Deleuze. These 
processes are determined by his account of time as a nine-fold manifold of processes deduced 
from Deleuze’s account of three interconnected syntheses of time in his Difference and Repetition 
(Différence et repetition, henceforth DR). It will also be argued that Deleuze’s philosophy of time 
is speculative in a broad sense and that Deleuze’s account of the real is opposed to forms of 
abstraction which associate objects with conceptual, perceptual or transcendental identity. In 
order to demonstrate the radical and systematic nature of Deleuze’s account of process, there is a 
discussion of a basic process underlying his manifold of time. This process is opposed to Markov 
chains, in order to set up an opposition to interpretations of Deleuze’s philosophy that deny its 
metaphysical and speculative approach in favour of scientific realism.
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TIME AS A MANIFOLD IN DELEUZE’S PHILOSOPHY OF TIME
In order to understand Deleuze’s critique of approaches to the object through identity in 
a concept (DR, 26) or through identity in a representation (DR, 179-80), it is necessary 
to follow how he uncovers processes of becoming behind these conceptual abstractions. 
In turn, these processes depend on the definition of time as a multiple process. His phi-
losophy of time is a process philosophy of time where time is made through processes. 
This is in contrast to views where time acts as a container for events, or where time is 
a representation according to which events are situated. In Deleuze’s Difference and Rep-
etition, time is constructed around three interdependent syntheses, labelled first, second 
and third syntheses of time (DR 96-165).
The three syntheses are not abstract or cognitive but rather real synthetic process-
es; they are more like a chemical fusion than a combination presupposed by, occur-
ring in, or posited by a mind. Here, the syntheses will respectively be called contrac-
tion in the present, synthesis of the pure past and eternal return of difference. These 
names, though, are only short-hand for more complex processes and they must not 
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be mapped on to the ordinary division of time into present, past and future, or asso-
ciated with a timeline on which events can be indexed. Deleuze’s philosophy of time 
is a radical and revolutionary metaphysics of time that calls into question nearly all 
such ordinary assumptions because it claims that time is made as multiple by many 
processes. This multiplicity contradicts notions of the unity of time and of its unique 
direction from past to future.
The interdependence of the syntheses is very important, since each one, as primary 
process, includes the others as dimensions. Primary here indicates an independence 
from the dimensions (DR, 111). For example, the first synthesis is a contraction of the 
past and of the future, in different ways, where the past and the future depend on a se-
lective process determining the present which itself does not depend on the contract-
ed past and future. This relation of dimensions means that each synthesis is in fact 
three-fold: there is the prior process and then the two dimensions. For the present, we 
have the present as selective process and the past and future as contracted dimensions 
of that selection. (DR, 101-102) The syntheses therefore give us a nine-fold set consti-
tuting time as a manifold of processes. We have the present as primary synthesis, as 
dimension of the past and as dimension of the future. This tripartite distinction also 
holds for the past and the future.
Any isolation of any one of these processes is incomplete due to their interdepen-
dence. Nonetheless, it is possible to treat the syntheses separately, so long as we under-
stand that an incomplete picture has been given and so long as the consequences of this 
incompleteness are taken into account. This raises a difficult question with respect to 
the notion of primary synthesis which reveals important factors in Deleuze’s treatment. 
A primary synthesis is independent with respect to its dimension under the primary 
characteristic process. It is not, however, independent either of its role as dimension ac-
cording to other syntheses, or of other processes determining it as primary yet passive 
with respect to these processes. So primary does not indicate absolute independence as 
a particular synthesis of time, or within a particular synthesis of time, or as pure activity. 
The present as a selection determining contractions of the past and of the future is itself 
determined by the second synthesis and by the third. It is also determined as a passive 
synthesis and as an active synthesis in the present (DR 105-6). It is therefore more accu-
rate to speak of an indivisible and complex manifold of times.
Here is a grid of the manifold which will also serve as the grid for explaining how 
objects must be processes in relation to time. The grid is an imperfect representation for 
the following reasons. First, each square is not a sufficient definition of each time and 
synthesis. Second, each line and each column must not be seen as a set of three indepen-
dent processes. Third, the grid as whole should not be understood as divisible accord-
ing to its squares. Instead, the grid and squares are a starting point for an account that 
must show the relations between squares in an account aiming at completeness, rather 
than self-sufficient analytical distinctions. On the grid, primary processes are on the 
left-to-right, top-to-bottom diagonal, all other processes are dimensions of the primary 
processes on the corresponding column:
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First synthesis of  
time (synthesis in 
the present)
Second synthesis of  
time (synthesis of  
the past)
Third synthesis of  
time (synthesis for 
the future)
Present As prior selection As made to pass as the 
most contracted state 
of the pure past
As incapable of re-
turning and as cae-
sura, assembly and 
seriation
Past As dimension con-
tracted into the pres-
ent through a singular 
selection
As synthesis of the pure 
past
As selected to return 
as pure difference and 
as symbolic process
Future As dimension con-
tracted into the pres-
ent as a range of pos-
sibilities assigned given 
probabilities
As freedom and destiny As eternal return of 
difference
The caveats about the interconnected nature of this grid and about the correct 
way to approach it are important from an explanatory point of view—as already 
discussed—but they are also important from a practical point of view. It would be a 
mistake simply to apply the grid to objects according to its distinct squares in order 
to give a version of Deleuze’s philosophy of time as relevant to objects or indeed to 
any given phenomenon. Any such application might well start with such a move, but 
it must go beyond it to demonstrate the complexity of relations between any identi-
fied processes.
DELEUZE’S BASIC PROCESS AND MARKOV CHAINS
Though time is a complex multiplicity of processes for Deleuze, there are common 
patterns across them. The most basic and important one is partly inherited from 
Lacan, though not without important changes. The most significant locus for this in-
heritance is Logic of  Sense (Logique du sens, henceforth LS; see LS 50-56 for a study of 
Deleuze’s account of double series and seriation in relation to Lacan’s reading of Poe) 
though it carries through to Difference and Repetition. The reading of Lacan in relation 
to Roussel and Poe in Logic of  Sense is split in Difference and Repetition into a discussion 
of Lacan in relation to the virtual object (DR 134-5, see also LS 264-5) and Roussel in 
relation to dark precursors and double series (DR 154-60). Deleuze’s process also bears 
loose connections to Markov chains (according to Lecercle, taken via Ruyer in Differ-
ence and Repetition, though the connection is not entirely evident in DR itself, see DR 
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279). These influences and differences will be made more precise here in relation to 
Markov. The relation to Lacan is more complex and is discussed by Lecercle in close 
context to his work on Markov discussed below; however, this large and important 
connection to Lacan is beyond the scope of this essay.
The basic process is a disjunctive synthesis across at least two series (LS 265-7). This 
synthesis has two important functions that can seem paradoxical when considered to-
gether. First, there is a synthesis of states of the two series as they are related to one 
another through linked terms in each. Second, though, that synthesis implies disjunc-
tions between states of each series when taken in abstraction from the other series and 
the relating terms. So there is a relation between two series synthesising their different 
states, yet the effect on each series of this synthesis is such that states of that series are 
independent from one another. The synthesis is hence disjunctive within each series, yet 
synthetic across two or more series (LS 267).
It is important to stress that the series must not be viewed sequentially, but rather 
that their transformation occurs instantaneously for each state of the series (LS 194). 
It is also essential for Deleuze’s model that sequences should not be impervious to 
transformation since, as will be shown below, sequence imposes a linearity on models 
that prejudges how they can be transformed and therefore conditions the forms of 
time they then imply. This conditioning can occur, for instance, when earlier mem-
bers in the sequence are labelled ‘past’ and later ones ‘future’ in relation to a ‘pres-
ent’ member, or when a concept of distance can be used to indicate separation of 
elements in the series according to the measure of a timeline corresponding to the 
sequence.
For example, given series A’ and B’ related respectively by twinned elements a’ and 
b’, the introduction of new relating elements a’’ and b’’ instantaneously transforms A’ and 
B’ into A’’ and B’’ with no predictability in how A’ becomes A’’ or B’ becomes B’’, hence 
the serial disjunction. A’ and A’’ are independent as members of the series of A series, 
but they are related when taken with B’ and B’’ through the relating elements a’, b’, a’’, b’’. 
A synthetic relation connects A’, B’, A’’ and B’’ through the relation of a’/b’ to a’’/b’’. Yet 
states of the A series are independent, as are states of the B series. This independence 
and disjunction is an effect of the synthetic relation. 
In terms of the first synthesis in the manifold grid of time the disjunctive synthe-
sis takes place through the following properties. Each novel selection and contraction 
through a first synthesis is a disjunction with the selection and contraction of other 
first syntheses, yet these are related through their passing as dimension of the pure 
past and return as caesura, assembly and seriation as dimension of the third synthesis. 
Primary syntheses communicate as dimensions of other syntheses, though they are 
independent as primary syntheses. In the language of the living present (DR 97), ad-
opted by Deleuze in his study of the first synthesis in Difference and Repetition, any living 
present is a disjunction with any other, yet they are related as dimensions of the pure 
past and of the eternal return of difference. This form of relation and communication 
of processes, defined as non-communicating or independent under some primary pro-
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cess or definition, is one of the most fundamental problems of Deleuze’s philosophy. 
It can be found in Logic of  Sense in the discussion of the communication of events (LS 
198-207). It returns in Deleuze’s work on Leibniz’s Monadology in The Fold: Leibniz and 
the Baroque with the communication of monads ‘with no windows’ on to each other (Le 
pli: Leibniz et le baroque, henceforth LP, LP 38-44). 
Take a series A’ given by a pattern of beads hung on a string between two poles. 
Let there be another series of beads, B’, parallel to A’ and also hung on poles. Let 
the series be moved by a flow of air moving the beads such that the flow around A’ 
changes the flow around B’ and vice versa. If the two series accord with Deleuze’s 
disjunctive synthesis, when the relation of the flow of air to the resistance of the beads 
changes we know that there will be a change in the pattern and the regularity of the 
flow. We can describe this change by describing and tracing the new flow and new 
patterns, A’’ and B’’. But, crucially and counter-intuitively, according to Deleuze’s 
model and against law-driven or probabilistic accounts, when there is a disjunctive 
synthesis we can never fully predict the new patterns based on the old patterns and 
on the new and old flows. Nor can we fully explain their relations retrospectively. 
There is a disjunction of patterns although they follow from relations between the 
two series, yet they are synthesised through their relation to one another through the 
change introduced into each one of them. Syntheses are cross series; disjunctions are 
internal to series.
I have given this example to highlight the radical and problematic nature of 
Deleuze’s basic process. If we are dealing with physical objects, it appears that he 
is committed to a position running counter to areas in which we have reasonably 
secure theoretical and practical knowledge; aerodynamics in this case. So it seems 
that Deleuze is committed to a speculative denial of well-established knowledge and 
the scientific practices and theories it is based upon. This is not the case. The basic 
process underlying Deleuze’s philosophy of time is consistent with established forms 
of knowledge, which it can ascribe to series if  we abstract them from transformative syn-
theses. In this case the abstraction would operate through the tautological assump-
tion ‘given no transformative disjunctive syntheses, then…’ The example is then not 
designed to extend Deleuze’s claim to physical objects and knowledge about their 
behaviour, but rather to give a model explaining Deleuze’s process as it applies to dis-
junctions in established models that call into question knowledge of  them based on an abstraction 
from real processes.
Deleuze’s philosophy is therefore compatible with accounts from the sciences. 
However, his concept of the real extends from an actual abstraction, as given by 
a form of knowledge, into a speculative model designed to explain transformations 
which show such forms to be incomplete. His basic process and his manifold philoso-
phy of time are designed to underpin this complete speculative and metaphysical ver-
sion of the real. Abstraction is therefore defined here as a cut away from the processes 
constituting the real through two moves. First, a restricted field of those processes is 
taken, for instance, by considering a series in abstraction from others. Second, that 
JAMES WILLIAMS 67
restricted series is itself considered in a limited manner, for instance within set bound-
aries. Abstraction should not be seen as a purely negative term here. It is necessary 
and is itself explained as a real process. However, if it is taken as providing either the 
last word on the real, or a sufficient critical basis for denying the reality of other pro-
cesses and broader metaphysical frames, then serious damage is done to our capacity 
to explain real processes.
It is at this point that a significant counter-position to my reading can be intro-
duced. In describing the difference between Deleuze’s model and one based on an 
abstraction, where abstraction is itself defined in relation to a speculative account of 
the real, I twice used a vague term: ‘fully’. The term was first used in relation to pre-
diction and second in relation to explanation. It could be claimed that the use of this 
ill-defined term is a sign of a sleight of hand which allows my account to retain pre-
dictability and explanation while also denying them in an ill-defined but supposedly 
important ‘full’ situation. This in turn is a sign of a failure to account for the basis for 
the limits set for prediction and explanation, which turns out to be illegitimate, in 
the sense of based on an ill-founded speculative move. The wider background to this 
critique is that speculative moves are illegitimate unless they are based on theories 
taken from the natural sciences or from formal disciplines such as mathematics. There 
either has to be a scientific ground for incompleteness in prediction or explanation 
(say, from chaos theory) or a formal one (say from Gödel’s incompleteness theorem). 
Otherwise, a speculative move is in fact based on illegitimate idealist grounds. This is 
a charge made against me by Manuel DeLanda in response to my earlier critique of 
his position on Deleuze and the sciences.1 
In answering this point, I will first give a definition of speculative as it is used in this 
essay. I will call the construction of a philosophical system speculative when it introduc-
es a concept or set of concepts to a system which, though they may be taken from other 
subjects and practices, have a meaning, or consistent place, or justification proper to the 
philosophy. For example, a philosophy of mind is speculative when it takes a concept of 
mind from cognitive sciences, but then sets that concept into a system such that at least 
one of these condition holds: the concept of mind departs from the one found in the sci-
ence, or is assigned a consistent role within a system with non-scientific elements, or is 
justified in terms of claims to truth or validity that are not scientific. This definition is 
deliberately very wide, such that almost all philosophy must be speculative. However, it 
matters how philosophy is speculative: through the creation of new meanings, consistent 
systems and claims to truth and validity.
In line with this definition, the answer to the critique about the speculative aspect 
of Deleuze’s philosophy is that it is not a matter of concern that a philosophy is specu-
lative. Any philosophy that is not slave to another subject will be—Indeed so will such 
     1. Manuel DeLanda, ‘Afterword: The Metaphysics of Science: An Interview with Manuel DeLanda’ in 
The Force of  the Virtual: Deleuze, Science and Philosophy, Peter Gaffney (ed.), Minneapolis, University of Min-
nesota Press, 2010, pp 325-33, p 329. James Williams, ‘Science and dialectics in the philosophies of Deleuze, 
Bachelard and DeLanda’, Paragraph: a Journal of  Modern Critical Theory, vol. 29, no. 2, July 2006, pp 98-114.
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subservient philosophies at the point where they justify their submission. It is matter 
of concern, though, if the speculative aspect is poorly done on its own terms and in 
relation to the history of philosophy. So the deeper concern of the critique outlined 
above is that my account of the systematic aspect of Deleuze’s speculative moves is 
vague and ill-defined, as shown by the loose use of ‘fully’ with no well-defined bound-
aries, in relation to prediction and explanation. The counter to this is that we can 
define the limits of explanation and prediction in Deleuze’s system accurately accord-
ing to the concept of disjunction. Where there is a disjunction, the validity of predic-
tion is broken and the type of explanation changes. This marks a shift from established 
explanations to necessarily experimental ones seeking out new modes of explanation 
in accordance with syntheses between series that are internally forced into a disjunc-
tion by their relation. I will now clarify this further by distinguishing Deleuze’s process 
from work on Markov chains.
Jean-Jacques Lecercle has discussed the combination of disjunction, or indepen-
dence, and synthesis, or partial dependence, in relation to language and to Markov 
chains in mathematics (and their applications in other sciences). Markov chains are gen-
erated by the addition of novel states independent of earlier ones in a series: ‘[the state] 
retains no memory of where it has been in the past. This means that only the current 
state of the process can influence where it goes next’.2 For example, in a game of snakes 
and ladders, each throw of the dice is independent from earlier throws. There is no 
memory in the dice of earlier outcomes or later ones (of earlier ‘luck’ or ‘misfortune’). 
The novel state is independent of past ones, yet probabilities can be assigned to future 
states, hence the partial dependence. The probable outcomes of a game of snakes of lad-
ders can be assigned after each throw of the dice, but they also change with each throw 
and with its independence from earlier ones.
Lecercle explains Deleuze and Guattari’s interest in Markov chains according to 
the following properties: they are ‘linear’, ‘aleatory’ and ‘partially dependent’.3 Lecer-
cle’s example for this is in the generation of words completing a sentence: ‘To use my 
example again, if I feel a strong compulsion to finish the Markov chain ‘Pride comes 
before a …’ with the word ‘fall’, nothing actually prevents me from engaging in a cre-
ative exploitation of the proverb by replacing the expected noun with another one: 
‘Pride comes before a vote of impeachment’—so I was talking about Nixon all the 
time’.4 The sense of linear used here is of a series that states are added to. The sense 
of aleatory is that the choice is free. The sense of dependence is that a new sense 
emerges for the series with the new word. None of these are quite accurate enough 
for an understanding of the difference between Markov chains and Deleuze’s basic 
cross-serial process.
Though Lecercle’s essential study of Deleuze’s work on language captures something 
important about Deleuze and Guattari’s references to Markov chains and the opportu-
     2. James R. Norris, Markov Chains, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. xiii.
     3. Jean-Jacques Lecercle, Deleuze and Language, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 96.
     4. Ibid. p. 95.
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nity they provide for a critique of Chomsky’s linguistics, the three properties outlined 
above need to be modified or at least explained further in order to understand Deleuze’s 
work on process and time in Difference and Repetition and Logic of  Sense. This is because the 
concept of linearity leads too rapidly to the idea of a line of time unfolding in a linear 
manner from past to future. An indication of this implication can be found in James 
Norris’s definition of Markov chains through the concept of ‘past’, as given above. For 
Deleuze, the most basic process is rather a relation across series and a radically aleatory 
disjunction between different states of single series, rather than a serial unfolding. For 
Deleuze the basic states are states of series, rather than elements added to a sequence. 
The notion of the aleatory does not depend on chance selection within a finite set (as it 
does in Markov chains) but rather in the introduction of a novel ‘transformer’ within a 
series in relation to a novel different ‘transformer’ in another series. This is why I use the 
adjective radical here in order to distinguish Deleuze’s aleatory ‘dice throw’ from proba-
bilistic definitions of chance. For Deleuze’s disjunction, a die morphs when it is thrown 
and loses its prior relations of probability. If it did not, there would not be disjunction in 
a fundamental sense.
This means that Deleuze’s model goes beyond even complex and interconnected 
Markov chains. First, this is because it is not a selection within a finite set. Second, it 
is because though it is not amenable to assigning probabilities in series when they are 
considered in terms of  the transformative relations between series. Of course this does not mean 
that we cannot think of series in terms of probability when they are treated in abstrac-
tion. Partial dependence must therefore be understood as dependence within a series 
until it is disrupted through its relation to another one which introduces an indepen-
dent disruption through both series without exception. Deleuze’s philosophical model 
can therefore be seen as an attempt to go beyond the theorems of Markov chains. The 
standard definition of a Markov process is at odds with Deleuze’s account of time in its 
most basic process (I would argue that this is also the case in terms of the third synthe-
sis of time and Deleuze’s concepts of caesura and eternal return, but that is beyond the 
scope of this essay—for a full account of these process see my Gilles Deleuze’s Philosophy 
of  Time: A Critical Introduction and Guide).5 The process relating series in Deleuze’s model 
therefore has to be defined in such a way as to be inconsistent with Markov chains. 
The process does not depend on a closed set, it is not linear and it is resistant to the 
assigning of probabilities according to the mathematical theorems for Markov chains. 
The occurrence of a new state in a Markov chain is not a disjunction or real event in 
Deleuze’s sense of the terms.
However, the discussion of Markov chains is important and helpful here because it 
allows for a general specification of the properties of Deleuze’s most basic process. It is 
a full transformation of at least two series by at least two related factors whose effects 
instantaneously run the length of the series and retain no memory of prior states of the 
series. In his conclusion to his insightful essay on Deleuze and chaos, Gregory Flaxman 
     5. James Williams, Gilles Deleuze’s Philosophy of  Time: A Critical Introduction and Guide, Edinburgh, Edinburgh 
University Press, 2011, pp. 86-134.
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therefore underestimates the differences between Deleuze’s account of the ideal game 
from Logic of  Sense (LS 74-82) and Markov chains, as referred to in Deleuze’s Foucault 
and Deleuze and Guattari’s L’anti-œdipe ‘proches d’une chaîne de Markoff’.6 Flaxman 
rightly notes Deleuze’s insistence on a single rule of ‘variability, variation and variety’.7 
This underestimates the rigidity of Markov chains, which map many cases of games and 
process with fixed degrees of probability for given states, in contrast to Deleuze’s most 
basic processes denying the possibility of assigning such probabilities in relation to new 
states and transformations. The challenge, in studying Deleuze’s philosophy of time, is then 
to explain how he can present us with a consistent manifold of time without returning 
to regularity or to a mathematical model such as Markov chains, yet retaining coherent 
structures and processes.
OBJECTS IN MANIFOLD TIME
Having outlined the manifold of times deduced from Deleuze’s three syntheses, as well 
as the basic process underlying the manifold, I will now suggest how both transform 
our conceptions of objects. In this section I will situate objects in the manifold. In the 
concluding section, I will combine this with the basic process in response to critical 
objections.
When Deleuze considers objects and subjects as repeated, in relation to the first 
synthesis of time in Difference and Repetition, he makes the claim that neither an objective 
nor a subjective account is satisfactory for an understanding of repetition and time: ‘In 
considering repetition in the object, we remained short of the conditions that render 
an idea of repetition possible. But in considering change in the subject, we are already 
beyond them, in the general form of difference’. (DR 97) The processes of time as re-
peated variations are neither repetition of objects, not repetition for a subject. Instead, 
objects and subjects must be thought of in terms of the syntheses of time, as opposed to 
grounding those syntheses on objects and an objective realm or subjects and their inten-
tions and acts. Objects and subjects are processes of the manifold of times. When objects 
or subjects are posited outside such processes the object or the subject is an abstraction 
from the real.
For the purposes of this essay, I will set aside the question of the subject except 
where it impinges directly on reflection about the object in time. This leaves the prob-
lem of how objects must be thought of in relation to Deleuze’s account of a manifold 
of time as multiple processes, and in terms of the basis process outlined in the previous 
section. In this section, I will consider the manifold, leaving the basic process of dual 
related series to the next. Here is the time grid again, expressed according to a generic 
object W defined as process:
     6. Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, London, Continuum Press, 2006, pp. 71, p. 96. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guat-
tari, Anti-Oedipus, London, Continuum Press, 2004, p. 42, note that this reference is situated at a point where 
Deleuze returns to his work on Lacan and Poe.
     7. Gregory Flaxman, ‘The subject of chaos’, in The Force of  the Virtual: Deleuze, Science and Philosophy, Paul 
Gaffney (ed.), Minnesota University Press, 2010, pp. 191-209, p. 209.
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First synthesis of  
time (synthesis in 
the present)
Second synthesis 
of  time (synthesis 
of  the past)
Third synthesis of  
time (synthesis for 
the future)
Present An object W is a se-
lection in the present
W is made to pass as 
the most contracted 
state of the pure past
W is incapable of re-
turning and institutes 
a caesura, assembly 
and seriation of events
Past As singular selection 
in the present W con-
tracts all past series 
but to greater or lesser 
degrees
W presupposes but 
does not have effects 
on a synthesis of the 
pure past
W returns only as 
pure difference and as 
symbolic process
Future All future series are 
contracted by W ac-
cording to a different 
ranges of probability
W has a degree of 
freedom and a destiny
W presupposes but 
does not have any ef-
fects on the eternal 
return of difference
If we study the first column on the first synthesis of time, a number of important and 
surprising features of objects come to the fore. An object is not a well-delimited thing in 
space-time, but rather a process of selection. An object is not a thing that is picked out or 
selected. The object is a selection that picks out and selects past and future series within 
a process. For the past, this selection gives greater and lesser degrees of significance to 
series within a contraction in the present. The processes operating from the present on 
the past are selection and contraction. Selection means changes in degree. Contrac-
tion means a transformation of a past series according to a change in the present. The 
present here is therefore not an instant or an eternal present, but rather a transforma-
tion across series with a focal zone. Loosely we can call this zone the living present. 
An object is therefore a process concentrating past and present through its living pres-
ent, where life must not be associated with human life or even biological processes, but 
rather simply with a selection. 
For the future, the selection in the first synthesis alters ranges of possibilities through 
changes in probability. The selection picks out an object in the living present and con-
tracts past series. It also contracts later series by assigning different probabilities to them. 
(DR 97) This selection is not by a subject, but indicates a mere change in a pattern, this 
could be a pattern in the brain of something picked out as a human subject, but it could 
just as easily be a morphological change in a biological series, or a crack appearing in a 
material, or a change in a weather pattern. The key is that the change selects series dif-
ferently. For the past this is in terms of degrees of significance of series in terms of their 
contraction in the living present; for instance, when a past series becomes unimportant 
due to present selection.
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For example, a selection occurs in the living present with changes in territory or cli-
mate which then concentrate series of evolutions differently, making some lines lead to 
extinction and others ongoing success stories. For the future, change in the living pres-
ent selects different probabilities to assign to possible futures. A different pattern in the 
brain might make some futures for that human being very unlikely. The crack in a vase 
might make its future as an effective water carrier extremely dubious or a change in 
weather patterns might make successful wine growing in Perthshire more likely. There 
is no concentration of the past in that crack that is not also a concentration of the future. 
However, these processes are asymmetrical since one assigns different degrees to actual 
series whereas the other assigns different probabilities to possible series.
Two types of remark can now be made in relation to objects in relation to the past 
and the future. First, it is striking how underdeveloped Deleuze’s work is in terms of its 
detail. For instance, there needs to be a lot more research on the exact form of probabili-
ty and possibility implied by the idea of the future as dimension of the living present. Are 
some things impossible? Are others incommensurable? What is the right formal account 
of probability? How does the use of the possible and the probable in the first synthesis 
of time work with the critique of the category of the possible in Deleuze account of the 
real and the virtual in Difference and Repetition? It is not that Deleuze’s texts fail to consider 
such questions, but rather that the places where they are tackled are very different and 
disparate; for instance in terms of incommensurability and incompossibility in Logic of  
Sense (LS, 199-203) and The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque (LP, 79-86). 
Second, the first synthesis of time can be a trap for readers because it is somewhat 
close to our grooved intuitions about past, present and future. For example, the differ-
ence between past and future dimensions fits well with accounts of the asymmetry of 
time implied by a difference between the uncertainty of the future and the settled nature 
of the past. It is therefore very important to stress the incompleteness of the living pres-
ent and its contractions of the past and of the future in relation to questions about, past 
present and future in Deleuze’s thought. The present is never simply the living present, 
or the past the contracted past, or the future the probable future. This is not only be-
cause there are other processes that must be taken account of, such as the pure past, the 
passing present and the future as eternal return. It is because these processes play neces-
sary roles within the first synthesis of time, its prior process and dimensions.
A first understanding of Deleuze’s extension of the present, even when defined as 
a contraction, can be found in its definition as made to pass by the pure past in the 
second synthesis of time (DR 105) and as never to return by eternal return in the third. 
It is important not to view these as separate from the present as selection and contrac-
tion. Instead, the present is a selection and, inseparably, also a passing away never to 
return. This means that Deleuze’s account of objects can itself be extended in two origi-
nal and deeply challenging ways. An object is a selection across series, but as such it is 
immediately a falling away into a pure past, that is, not as a representation but rather as 
something that cannot be represented. This does not mean that it becomes nothing in 
relation to the pure past, but rather that the effect on the present lies in a change of di-
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mensions and degrees of pure relations, that is, of relations that are not between things 
or terms but rather strictly to other relations as degrees of relatedness. When a present is 
made to pass, its passing changes the relations of degrees and significance for everything 
else that has and will pass.
In a small earth tremor, the last remaining vase turned by a famous potter is smashed 
as it totters off a display. The line of creations is concentrated differently, destined to 
disappear in the quake. Future probabilities change too; no one will discover a long 
lost piece, though forgers are more likely to try to make one. The vase, though, has not 
passed into record as a representation in the pure past, since according to Deleuze’s philoso-
phy of time any such record is a concentration in the present selection, as dimension of 
the present. The pure past makes the present pass by separating the present as process 
from the past as ever changing reserve of relations of value that return in the future. This 
is one of Deleuze’s most difficult thoughts but in terms of objects it can be understood 
in this way. An object is a selection concentrating past and future, but as such it is also a 
passing away into incapacity to change anything. As it smashes the vase, the hammer can 
never again smash it in the same way and therefore its capacity to alter the values and 
significance of that blow also fades away (for a good technical discussion of passing away 
and the pure past, see Jay Lampert’s Deleuze and Guattari’s Philosophy of  History).8
Does this mean that the hammer and vase pass into nothingness or into a frozen 
record representing passed moments? No, that which makes the process pass is not a 
physical passing but one of relations of values and intensities. A process as living pres-
ent passes because its significance is altered in relation to all the values it is related to as 
these values change in the pure past. A moment cannot be reclaimed because the way 
in which it matters in relation to the way all other moments have and will matter has 
changed. It’s not that the wedding gift is smashed irreparably. Nor even that you smashed it. It’s that 
nothing feels or can ever be the same again since you did.
The pure past and eternal return, as future, are therefore very important in relation 
to objects in Deleuze’s manifold of time because neither one allows the present object as 
selection and concentration to touch it in any way. This is why the manifold grid for W 
does not refer to it at the past in the second synthesis or at the future in the third. The 
pure past and the differences of eternal return are neutral, not in the sense of impotent, 
but in the sense of impassive. W is not a variable in those parts of the grid. No object re-
turns. No object has a presence in the pure past, in the reserve of values ever changing 
in intensity and ever calling all objects to pass.
Is this then a deliverance of objects from the past and the future? Not at all: it is a 
shift from understanding objects in a causal relation to the past and to the future, in any 
relation of continuity with them, to an understanding of the present process as a break 
and as a special kind of transformation resisting external structures or laws guaranteeing 
general types of continuity. Each process becomes singular as break and transformation 
in relation to the pure past and to eternal return. It is only in that singularity, in singular 
differences, that there is a passing away and a return.
     8. Jay Lampert, Deleuze and Guattari’s Philosophy of  History, London: Continuum, 2006, p. 46.
COSMOS AND HISTORY74
So if objects are thought of in relation to Deleuze’s manifold of time, they do not 
only become processes. They also become causally restricted as such. In relation to the 
pure past, any object is also a moment of freedom: its passing does not condition what 
follows it, either in terms of appropriate reaction or in terms of necessary effects. Yet the 
object also has a destiny, but one that always goes beyond it, as a destiny to return differ-
ently and hence also as a trace in that difference. In relation to the future, the object as 
present process becomes a break or caesura within series (DR 120). Everything changes 
with the process as it ushers in the new. Yet in that change there is also an assembly of 
all series as transformed by it. In turn, this transformation allows for a seriation into the 
before and after of the change.
So when the earth trembles, or when a will snaps, something is broken. The break 
is not only a process changing the actual past and the possible future. It is also an open-
ing, a freedom for different and novel events. The process is also being made to pass 
and this passage into pure difference, into pure values, is all that can return in the future 
as novelty. The process has a double destiny in this return. It cannot return as itself but 
must return as the trace of the transformation of its passing. According to Deleuze’s defi-
nition of the third synthesis of time, the break is also a caesura where series—history if 
you like—are cut asymmetrically into before and after, yet also set into a new assembly 
(DR 120-1). As process an object transforms, passes away never to return as the same, 
yet returns as the return of difference. As such it transcends all boundaries in space and 
time. It is many different processes, each one carrying the object through other series as 
concentration, change in probability, gift of freedom, cut, seriation, assembly, destiny, 
oblivion of the same and return of pure differences.
CONCLUSION
From Deleuze’s work on time as process, I have shown how objects must also be com-
plex manifolds of processes that can be understood according to a manifold of times. 
This work is only preliminary though. It only shows the promise and complexity of De-
leuze’s work for an approach to objects. The detail of that work remains to be done in 
deeper practical and theoretical analyses. The promise for such work is two-fold. From 
a negative point of view, it provides a basis for a critique of theories of the object that 
make claims for its independence from processes of becoming and of selection, of evolu-
tion and conflict. When viewed from Deleuze’s account of time any object is a crossing 
point for transformative interactions, it is made from and expresses at times conflicting 
and at other times synthetic encounters. An object can never be assigned final bound-
aries in time or space. From a positive point of view, Deleuze’s speculative process phi-
losophy gives us a rich frame for explaining and interacting with objects. It reveals our 
investments in them as mutual processes, rather than one-way projections. It also shows 
the many ways in which objects must necessarily thwart and overcome those invest-
ments. This speculative approach avoids any mystery to be assigned to objects in their 
resistance to thought. Instead, resistance is the product of the multiplicity and com-
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plexity of processes. Their multiple natures mean that any object must be approached 
through many different dimensions and according to different orders of priority that 
cannot be reduced to a totalising final view. The complexity comes from the role of sin-
gular selections within processes. None are simply genera. Processes cannot be viewed 
in the abstract without losing something of the real object in each singular series of pro-
cesses drawn together according to individual syntheses. This means that objects work 
within multi-layered worlds. These are determined by singular selections, yet also inter-
act with one another as selections, again though with no possibility of either totalising 
or fully disjunctive solutions to the paradox of singular worlds taking in one another.
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